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JUSTICE MURPHY: THE GOALS ATTEMPTED 
JOHN P. FRANKt 
"What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, 
and towalkhumblywith thy God?" 
:Uical: 6:8. 
THE late Justice Murphy was the most underestimated member of 
the Supreme Court in our time. 1 The bulk of lawyers' talk about him 
for years has been hostile and patronizing. Sometimes the attack has 
been violent, charging that Murphy knew no law, that he was merely 
reading his personal predilections into his decisions. 2 Even when 
friendly, it has still been patronizing, as when the commentator ob-
served that Murphy seemed to reach fairly happy results even though 
he lacked proper concern for legal techniques. 3 The common elements 
in both attitudes has been the observer's judgment that Murphy was 
"subjective," and either inadequately mindful of rules and precedents, 
or ignorant of them. 
The charge of "subjectivity" is particularly inappropriate if it sug-
gests that Murphy's jurisprudence was a product not of philosophy, 
but of whim. It is doubtful if any Justice ever kept a firmer wall be-
tween his personal predilections and his public ideals. 
Judge Learned Hand, in a eulogy of Cardozo, observed on the re-
markably impersonal quality of Cardozo's justice. Cardozo could 
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
1. Bibliographical note on Justice Murphy's judicial career: Justice Murphy took his 
seat on the Supreme Court on Feb. 5, 1940, and his opinions arc reported in 309 U.S. to 
338 U.S. For a very short, but remarkably prescient essay upon his appointment see Bates, 
The Ne-.JJ Supreme Co11rt Judge: A1~ Appraisal, 26 A.B.A.]. 107 (19~0). The most c.---
tended article on his opinions is Barnett, Mr. Justice Mttrplay and Citoil Libcrtics, 32 Co:u;. 
L.Q. 177 (1947). The 12th chapter of McCuNE, THE NINE YouNG M~::; (1947) is on 
Murphy. PRITCHETT, THE RoosEVELT COURT (1948) refers frequently to Murphy, and my 
own articles in 15, 16, and 17 U. OF CHI. L. REv. on the work of the Court for the term 
preceding the issue of the REVIEw discuss Murphy's opinions along with those of his 
brethren. They will be cited hereinafter as, e.g., Frank, 15 CHr. 1 (1947). The 1!ICHIGAU 
LAw REVIEW will publish an issue in his memory and articles on Murphy by Pickering and 
Gressman are currently under preparation for tlte CHICAGO and CoLU.MDL\ LAw REviEws. 
Mr. Gressman, an attorney in \Vashington, D.C., is at present the custodian of the enor-
mous collection of 1furphy papers. 
2. For journalist samples of the hostile and patronizing variety, see Editorial, "rash-
ington Post, July 20, 1949, p. 12, col. 3; Schlesinger, Tlae Supreme Court, 1947, For-
tune, Jan., 1947, p. 73. 
3. See, e.g., McCuNE, op. cit. sllPra note 1, at 151. 
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"weigh the conflicting factors of his problems," said Hand, "without 
always finding himself in one scale or the other." 4 In an odd sense the 
same is true of Murphy, for the values and ideals which he found in the 
scales were frequently denials of his own personal prefer~nces. 
Thus Murphy, who had been a labor candidate as a politician, in the 
lifetime security of the Bench continued as a poor man's judge; 
yet in his purely personal life, he had no ovenvhelming interest 
in labor affairs and socially was almost exclusively in the company of 
those groups against whom he was deciding on the Bench. Professor 
Swisher's chapter, "The Octopus," in his biography of Justice Field 
describes the manner in which the social lobby absorbed judges and 
strengthened their conservatism.5 The social lobby furnished Murphy 
with the bulk of his friends, but left his views completely unaffected. 
Again, Murphy was a civil liberties judge. Yet his relations with 
Father Coughlin, the complete antithesis of everything Murphy pub-
licly stood for, were apparently close enough so that Murphy's af-
fectionate family saw no incongruity in asking Coughlin to conduct 
the funeral services. 6 
It was particularly in his relations to his church and his religious faith 
that Murphy put aside what must have been pressing personal con-
siderations to take what he considered a public view on the issues be-
fore him. There could have been no more devout Catholic than he, 
and it would have been readily understandable if he had found a happy 
coincidence between the convenience of his church and the mandates 
of the law. Yet no one was more firm than Murphy in upholding the 
rights of the Jehovah's Witnesses, a bigoted sect which makes a special-
ity of anti-Catholicism. 7 
Murphy's stand in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases could have been 
discarded by his critics as bravado, a gesture of no consequence; or it 
might be rationalized as an indirect protection of Catholicism by build-
ing a bulwark for minorities. But in the great church and state cases of 
recent years,8 Murphy's position was so obviously independent of his 
creed as to call forth impassioned criticism from many of his fellow 
religionists,9 and he once heard his stand denounced at Sabbath serv-
4. Hand, Mr. Justice Cardo::o, 48 YALE L.J. 379, 381 (1938). 
5. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD, c. IX (1930). 
6. N.Y. Herald Tribune, July 21, 1949, p. 14, col. 8. The service was conducted by 
Rev. James Marvin, who applauded the "Christian spirit" in Murphy's opinions. N.Y. 
Times, July 23, 1949, p. 12, col. 2. 
7. The cases are considered below; and see Barnett, supra note 1, at 188 d seq., nnd 
McCuNE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 142 et seq. 
8. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (school bus case) ; Illinois 
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released time case). 
9. Responsible Catholic criticism of opinions in which Murphy joined, though hard· 
hitting, was of course impersonal. See, e.g., Butler, No Lamb of God ;,~ School, 167 
CATH. Woru.D 203 (1948). Less responsible criticism was extremely personal. Mr. Gress· 
man, custodian of the Murphy papers, informs me that a very great volume of bitter 
clippings were sent to Murphy. 
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ices. At times Murphy's position on legal issues coincided with the 
position of his church on the underlying social issue involved, and at 
times it conflicted.10 We may deduce that the principles guiding his 
decisions were quite apart from his Catholicism. 
Independence of church was accompanied by independence of party. 
Murphy clearly was no rubber stamp for either the Roosevelt or the 
Truman administration, and when he thought they e.xceeded their 
powers, he was quick to say so. Not even the cry of "wartime unity" 
could rally him to the administration when he disagreed with it, and he 
freely rejected the wartime policy as to the Japanese-Americans, the 
President's policy in Hawaii, and the war crimes trials. He stood firm 
against the administration in the coal strike of 1946.11 
In sum, to say that Murphy was reworking the law in tenns of his 
personal ideals is a far different thing from saying that he was a sub-
jectivist, a sort of gastronomical jurisprude using his power to pro-
mulgate his desires as law. If his decisions did not always flow from 
the precedents, they also did not flow from his whims. They were 
based on a philosophy sufficiently deeply worked out to Murphy's own 
satisfaction to withstand criticism. The application of that philosophy 
may on occasion have been defective, for Murphy is open to the charge 
that occasionally he let activities he opposed hide behind symbols he 
cherished. \¥hen he thought that child labor should, in a peculiar 
instance, be tolerated as an e.'\.-pression of religious conviction; 12 when 
he voted to eliminate subpoenas almost entirely in administrative 
hearings; 13 when he let a claim of freedom of speech becloud his vision 
of suppression of free speech by monopoly in radio and press 1"--in 
these instances, he may have deluded himself, though he intended to 
hold to his objectives. But these episodes are rare, for his philosophy 
guided him in a remarkably consistent course. 
Coordinate with the charge of subjectivity has been the charge of 
technical incompetence. It is true that Murphy was unconventional 
in his treatment of legal materials, but the evidence rejects the sugges-
tion that he could not have been a conventional lawyer if he had 
chosen. 15 His opinions were usually well written, and some achieve 
10. For e.-..amples of conflict, see cases cited note 8 supra. Examples of coincidence 
are the divorce cases, as Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Sherrer , •• 
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) (dissenting opinion). 
lL The cases referred to in this paragraph are cited and discussed below. 
12. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944). 
13". Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 218 (1946) ; sec 
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501,510 (1943). 
14. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943) ; Associated 
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 49 ( 1945). 
15. He frequently chose to be as conventional as anyone could desire. E.-..amplcs are 
his many tax opinions in which he spoke for the Court in situations of great technical 
comple.-..ity; see. e.g., Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524 (1947); Commissioner v. 
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). He '"as not a trail-blazing ta.-. e.'\.-pert, and some of his 
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greatness whether measured in terms of legal skill displayed or in 
terms of any other values. 16 
The larger insufficiency in this attack is in its assumption that 
Murphy's work ought to be measured in terms of rules, precedents, 
and the conventions of legal methodology. Perhaps it should, for cer-
tainly, even in this age of instrumentalism, these are still ovenvhelm-
ingly dominant standards. But even assuming the validity of the 
allegation that he was indifferent to legal doctrine, Murphy is also en-
titled to be appraised by his own standards. What were these stand-
ards and how successfully did they enable him to achieve, not the 
goals which others think he should have set, but the goals which he 
himself did set? 
His own standards represented a substantial ideal in the American 
culture, the ideal of the just judge who substitutes wisdom and kindli-
ness for booklearning and achieves what are, in popular ideology, far 
more wholesome results than does the legal technician. To many 
Americans, more often in the 18th and 19th Centuries than now, there 
is something a little slick in finding the solutions to human problems in 
books. That distrust resulted in such phenomena as making layman 
juries the judges of law as well as of fact, the practice of permitting 
non-lawyers to be judges, the practice of permitting anyone of good 
moral character to practice law.17 Though that set of values seems to 
be dying away in the 20th Century it remains in the jury system, 
which some of its students believe retains considerable vitality pri-
marily as an emergency exit through which the citizen escapes from 
thelaw.18 
Hence to say that Murphy was a policy making judge in a more 
extreme sense than all judges are policy makers, or to say that he 
completely subordinated technical considerations to humane results, 
is not to oust him from all claims to American affection. 19 The very 
conduct charged represents for many an important American idea. 
It is not necessary here to assess the validity of that ideal. The ideal 
exists. Murphy is not the first to subordinate legal science to public 
policy-·Marshall was even freer in making his cases fit his purposes-
opinions, after the fashion of tax opinions, have created as many problems as they solved, 
as, e.g., Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108 (1945); Commis· 
sioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946) ; Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946) ; 
but his many tax opinions are certainly e.xecuted in accordance with normal legal standards. 
16. For an example of a superb Murphy opinion in a difficult area of conflict o£ laws, 
see Industrial Comm. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947) ; and see the cases collected in note 
98 it~fra. 
17. The theme is enlarged and documented in Chapter V of the forthcoming work o£ 
HURsT, A HisTORY oF THE PRINCIPAL AGENCIES OF LAw, to be published by Little, Brown 
& Co. early in 1950. 
18. James, Fmzctio11s of l11dge and l11ry, 58 YALE L.J. 667,685-90 (1949). 
19. Contra: Schlesinger, srtpra note 2; Powell, Behind tile Split i1J llle StiPrcmc 
Conrt, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1949, § 6, p. 13, col. 1. 
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and he will not be the last. 20 Granting that Murphy was more faithful 
to a common conception of justice than to his casebooks, the life just 
closed deserves to be reviewed in terms of the goals actually attempted. 
SoME ELEl\!ENTs OF MURPHY's JusTICE 
The freedom of disse1Zt: religion, 
In the Murphy philosophy, the state might neither burden the carry-
ing on of religious practices, nor favor a particular religion or religion 
per se. Apostles of religious freedom in America have been many, and 
in these views Murphy held no lonely outpost. His convictions were 
no firmer than those of Stone, for example. Indeed, in the first flag 
salute case, which he quickly regretted, Murphy failed to join Stone in 
dissent. 21 But with rare exceptions, no-one has upheld a more all-
encompassing or thorough religious freedom than Murphy. 
This is not to suggest that he was undiscriminating in his judgments 
or that a case was over for Murphy because one side or the other took 
refuge in the Lord. Instead, his own devout faith caused him to give 
the closest attention to cases concerning religion. Jehovah's \Vitnesses 
usually found him their protector, but when one called the police of 
Rochester, New Hampshire, "damned Fascists," Murphy held the 
language not constitutionally protected though said in conjunction 
with the Witnesses' religious activity;22 and he stood with the Court 
in limiting the right of the sect to parade in the streets.23 But in situa-
tions over which reasonable men could differ, he regularly upheld the 
claim of religious freedom. 
Jehovah's Witnesses' problems arose in many forms. In their strug-
gle to win draft exemptions on the grounds of faith the \Vitnesses were 
constantly in the courts, and Murphy had the satisfaction of seeing his 
position in respect to the procedure for review of their draft claims pass 
from lone dissent into Court majority. In the first case of the series, 
involving the right of Witnesses to claim conscientious obje~tion as a 
defense to criminal proceedings for draft evasion instead of forcing 
them to follow the more circuitous route of habeas corpus, Murphy in 
dissent said, "The law knows no finer hour than when it cuts through 
formal concepts and transitory emotions to protect unpopular citizens 
against discrimination and persecution," and accordingly he supported 
the more convenient remedy. 24 
20. ·There is no important Murphy opinion which as completely warps the law to 
comport with felt necessities as Marshall's commerce clause opinions, considered in Fn.un~­
FURTER, THE CoMMERCE CLAUSE (1937), or Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 
How. 393 (U.S. 1857), or Vinson's opinion in United States v. United Mine Workers, 
330 u.s. 258 (1947). 
21. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
22. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
23. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
24. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 561 (1944). In subsequent cases the Court, 
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More substantial issues arose from the efforts of the Witnesses to 
spread their message on the streets. Chief ] ustice Hughes, before 
Murphy's appointment, had written the leading opinion on the right 
to distribute hand-bills free of discrimination; 26 but the question 
whether the activity could be subjected, not to licenses, but to non~ 
discriminatory taxes, came before Murphy. With it came the discussion 
of the right to distribute messages not only on the streets but from door 
to door. These proved the most difficult religious questions for the 
Court in the 1940's, and the basic tax question was decided first one 
way and then the other because of changing Court personnel. 26 
Throughout these disputes, Murphy held for the maximum protec-
tion to the right to proselytize. In one instance he sardonically ob-
served that "It would take a gifted evangelist ... to gross enough 
to pay the tax," 27 but whatever the amount, he thought the taxes in-
valid. Nor did it matter that the Witnesses sold their pamphlets: 
"Freedom of speech an.d freedom of the press cannot and must not 
mean freedom only for those who can distribute their broadsides with-
out charge. There may be others with messages more vital but purses 
less full, who must seek some reimbursement for their outlay or else 
forego passing on their ideas. The pamphlet, an historic weapon against 
oppression, is today the convenient vehicle of those with limited re-
sources because newspaper space and radio time are expensive and the 
cost of establishing such enterprises great." 28 The state should not 
handicap the missionary, he argued, by charging him for street space. 
The appointment of ] ustice Rutledge gave the proponents of this 
view a majority of five, a success which the deaths of Murphy and 
Rutledge may make momentary. The shift caused by the Rutledge 
appointment resulted in the opinions of May 3, 1943, reversing the 
tax cases 29 and also upholding the right of the Witnesses to proselytize 
from door to door unless both the municipality and the householders 
individually forbade their coming. 30 A month later the Court handed 
down the second flag salute opinion, this time invalidating the require-
ment of compulsory saluting in the 9chools. 31 
Murphy conceded that he had erred in the first flag salute case in 
as a practical matter though without technical inconsistency, came to the Murphy result; 
see Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). 
25. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
26. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943), in accord~ 
ance with Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (19~3). 
27. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584,616 (1942). 
28. Id. at 619. (Quotations throughout the text of this article have occasionally been 
very slightly altered to make for readability. Thus in the quote above, n citation has been 
omitted; and occasionally capitalization or punctuation has been altered or a word has 
been changed. In no instance'bas meaning been altered or affected.) 
29. Cases cited note 26 supra. 
30. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
31. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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putting the symbols of national unity ahead of spiritual integrity. 
"Reflection has convinced me that as a judge I have no loftier duty or 
responsibility than to uphold that spiritual freedom to its farthest 
reaches." 32 Unity, he had found, could not be the product of a gesture, 
for "It is in the freedom and the e.xa.mple of persuasion, not in force and 
compulsion, that the real unity of America lies." 33 
The composite of his convictions on religious freedom from state 
interference emerges clearly from his opinions. The only value higher 
than complete religious freedom was the "maintenance of effective 
government and orderly society," 34 and only if the menace to order 
were extreme would state regulation of religion be upheld. 
Murphy feared state aid to religion as much as state harm to reli-
gion. Both he considered forbidden by the Constitution and, since 
regulation would probably follow aid, he considered them interchange-
able evils. In the two great separation cases of recent years, the task 
of speaking for the Court fell to another, and Murphy did not write; 
but from his concurrence we know that he accepted the principle that 
state aid must be limited to welfare assistance. 35 The full nature of 
his views on this subject may be known when his personal papers are 
opened; but we do know that his resolution was unaffected by the 
criticism of some members of his own faith. 
The freedom of dissent: politics 
At times of extreme tension, the majority of society is tempted to 
crush its dissidents, and the recent war, if it had followed the pattern 
of its predecessors, would have afforded countless examples. Due 
largely to the determined purpose of a highly unusual Attorney Gen-
eral, Francis Biddle, there were very few political cases brought by the 
government during the War; and Murphy never had the opportunities 
of Holmes to consider from many angles the limitations, if any, on 
permissible political disagreement. But from the rare free speech cases 
and a group of denaturalization cases which came before him, we find 
a measure of his judgment on this score. 
The denaturalization laws provide a handy method for policing the 
politics of those Americans hom abroad because they permit de-
naturalization and deportation on the ground that the original cer-
tificate of naturalization was "fraudulently" or "illegally" obtained. 
At naturalization, the alien must take an oath that he will "support 
and defend the Constitution," and "bear true faith and allegiance." 
If he later adheres to Communism or Fascism, the government may 
contend that the same views were held at the time of taking the oath, 
32. I d. at 645. 
33. I d. at 646. 
34. !d. at 645. 
35. See cases cited note 8 supra. 
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that the adherence to the Constitution was thus not complete, and 
therefore that the certificate was "fraudulently" obtained. The net 
effect is to give a native American a far greater freedom of political 
action than is given the foreign born. 
The Schneiderman case was the leading denaturalization case in the 
war years.36 Schneiderman was brought to this country as an infant 
and naturalized when he reached twenty-one. Twelve years after his 
naturalization the government began denaturalization proceedings 
on the ground that he was a life-long Communist. The case, which 
aroused great interest, was argued and reargued for Schneiderman by 
Wendell Willkie and was decided in his favor five to four with Murphy 
writing the opinion of the Court. Beginning with the observation that 
the Court had heard the case because of "its possible relation to free-
dom of thought," a7 Murphy proceeded to enunciate extraordinarily 
strict rules for the conduct of denaturalization proceedings, and held 
that the evidence in the particular case did not measure up to the 
standard set. The nature of those rules and the details of the case are 
immaterial here; they were patently the products of fully stated policy. 
"[T]he facts and the law should be construed as far as is reasonably 
possible in favor of the citizen . . . . we certainly will not presume in 
construing the naturalization and denaturalization acts that Congress 
meant to circumscribe liberty of political thought. . . . We should 
not hold that petitioner is not attached to the Constitution by reason 
of his possible belief in the creation of some form of world union of 
soviet republics unless we are willing so to hold with regard to those 
who believe in Pan-Americanism, the League of Nations, Union Now, 
or some other form of international collaboration." 38 
In later cases, Murphy took a broader position than was necessary 
in the Schneiderman case. His ultimate stand, with Justice Rutledge, 
was that denaturalization was unconstitutional regardless of cause-
that in order to avoid creating second class citizens, the government 
must make its final judgment at the moment of naturalization. There-
after, native and foreign born citizens must be treated alike, each sub-
ject to valid laws for sedition or treason, but neither subject to exile 
and banishment. ag 
The free speech case in World War II most reminiscent of those of 
World War I was Hartzel v. U1tited States, 40 one of the rare prosecutions 
36. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.ll8 (1943). 
37. Id. at 119. 
38. I d. at 122, 132, 145. 
39. In Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 678 (1944), Murphy dissented in 
a denaturalization case which he thought departed from the Sclmcidcrma11 principles. In 
Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 675 (1946), he joined Justice Rutledge in a dis-
senting opinion challenging denaturalization in toto, and he adhered to these views in 
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,616 (1949). 
40. 322 u.s. 680 (1944). 
HeinOnline  -- 59 Yale L. J. 9 1949-1950
1949] JUSTICE MURPHY: THE GOALS ATTEMPTED 9 
in the second war under the Espionage Act of 1917. Hartzel, a vigor-
ous anti-Semite and Anglophobe, had mailed some si.x hundred mimeO-
graphed statements to various persons in 1942 urging abandonment 
of the war, internal race war, and an international war of the white 
race against all others. He seemed to believe that it would be best for 
America to be occupied by Germany while the United States adjusted 
to these new plans. He was charged with encouraging disloyalty, re-
fusing duty in the armed services, and obstructing recruitment. 
As author of the majority opinion, Murphy found it unnecessary to 
reconsider constitutional aspects of the Espionage Act. He adopted 
the theory of Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States 41 that the 
Act must be construed "in a strict and accurate sense." Since the Act 
applies only to conduct which "wilfully" achieves the results of foment-
ing mutiny or obstruction, Murphy construed it "in the conteAt of a 
highly penal statute restricting freedom of e.xpression" to require a 
deliberate purpose to affect present or potential military personnel. 
Finding that Hartzel's conduct was "quite consistent with a mere in-
tent to influence public opinion and to circulate malicious political 
propaganda," 42 Murphy declared that the requisite intent was not 
present. "An American citizen has the right to discuss these matters 
either by temperate reasoning or by immoderate and vicious invec-
tive." 43 
The Hartzel opinion put the requirement of specific intent so high 
that it made practically impossible any convictions under the Act of 
1917. It amounted to a judgment of policy that the country could 
fight the war without repression of even the extremest dissent. This 
was a practical application of Madison's words in the Virginia Report 
on the Alien and Sedition Acts in which he conceded the existence of 
abuses of freedom of the press, but said that "it is better to leave a few 
of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than by pruning 
them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits." 44 
The freedom of minorities 
With that acute feeling for minorities which one himself in a minority 
sometimes has, Murphy was a passionate defender of the rights of 
small groups, an automatic defender of the underdog. His greatest 
opportunity to give practical application to this conviction was his 
service as Governor General and High Commissioner of the Philippines, 
which his friends say he considered a high spot of his life. Throughout 
his service on the Court, one of his rare e.'\.tracurricular public interests 
41. 250 u.s. 616,627 (1919). 
42. 322 u.s. 680,688 (1944). 
43. Id. at 689. 
44. llfr. ~Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions in VmGmiA .u.-n IU:l<roCKY 
REsoLUTioNs oF 1798 AND 1799 at 21, 36 (1832). 
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was quiet participation as advisor or negotiator on behalf of the Islnndw 
ers, and he kept his flag as Governor General within his view in his 
private office at the Court. 
In the one case seriously involving Philippine welfare to come before 
him, Murphy was at his most outspoken in embracing purely "practiw 
cal" rather than "legal" considerations. 4ii The issue was the taxability 
of goods imported from the Philippines between the liberation from 
the Japanese and the establishment of the Philippine Republic. One 
question was whether the particular goods were in their "original 
package" and entitled to tax immunity, but the more general issue was 
whether Art. I, sec. 10 of the Constitution, prohibiting state ta..'\.es on 
"imports," applied to the Philippines at all. The tax collector con~ 
tended that the Philippines were not yet a "foreign" country, that 
shipments from them were not "imports," and that the clause there-
fore was inapplicable. 
The Court rejected the tax collector's argument. Murphy's lone 
concurrence on this point deserves extensive quotation because it is so 
completely revealing of his conception of the function of the judge-
made law as well as of his concern for the Philippines. He declared that 
shipments from the Philippines were "imports," a decision "compelled 
in good measure by practical considerations." The United States has 
matchless "moral and legal obligations" to the Philippines. 11War has 
stricken their land and their peoples. Their growing economy has been 
largely decimated by over three years of ruthless invasion and occupa-
tion. Now, with the Islands liberated, our moral and legal obligations 
are greater than ever before. . . . It is clear that the Philippines can-
not safely be thrown into the world market and left to shift for them-
selves. For the foreseeable future, at least, their economy must be 
closely linked to that of the United States. Accordingly it is my view 
that if it is reasonably possible to do so we should avoid a construction 
of the term 'imports' that would place Philippine products at a dis-
advantage on the American market. . . . If we can justifiably con-
strue that term to prohibit state taxation on shipments from the Phil-
ippines, we shaH to that extent have conformed to the national policy 
of aiding the Philippine reconstruction." No previous judicial inter-
pretations absolutely preclude this result, since decisions to the con-
trary were merely dicta, and the result is "a highly necessary and de-
sirable one." 46 
Equally blunt was Murphy's opinion in another major territorial case, 
in which he joined the majority in invalidating martial law in Hawaii 
and also concurred specially to elaborate his theme that "the usurpa-
tion of civil power by the military is so great in this instance as to war-
rant this Court's complete and outright repudiation of the action." 47 
45. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 691 (1945). 
46. The Murphy opinion summarized here is at 324 U.S. 691-4 (1945). 
47. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304,325 (1946). 
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The Hawaiian cases involved questions national as well as territorial, 
because this supreme wartime bid for military control of civilian 
justice and civilian life could have been followed by similar proclama-
tions on the mainland. Hence Murphy took occasion to speak generally 
of his "abhorrence of military rule." 48 But the military had made two 
special contentions particularly applicable to Hawaii; first, that the 
Constitution did not extend its protection there, and second, that due 
to the peculiar racial combinations in Hawaii, its people could not be 
trusted for jury service. On each point, 1\IIurphy was categorical. 
"The Constitution . . . applies in both spirit and letter to Hawaii," 4~ 
he began. Vigorously defending the Hawaiians against charges of dis-
loyalty, he pointed to the absence of a single recorded case of sabotage 
or espionage among them. He protested particularly against the im-
putations against Japanese-Americans in Hawaii: "Especially de-
plorable, however, is this use of the iniquitous doctrine of racism to 
justify the imposition of military trials. Racism has no place whatever 
in our civilization." so 
Murphy's castigations of "racism" were a part of a larger antipathy 
to what might be called "groupism," or the practice of holding one 
member of a group responsible for the independent deeds of another. 
His resistance to the denaturalization of Communists was in part, as 
described above, because he felt it incompatible with freedom of 
speech; but it was also because the evidence used by the government 
would usually be a century of Communist writings to which any par-
ticular Communist may never have subscribed at all:51 This resistance 
to group liability and group discrimination was the basis of Murphy's 
most dramatic work on the Supreme Court, his opposition to the 
government's program for Japanese and Japanese-Americans during 
the war. 
The first case in the series presented for determination the validity 
of a military order establishing a curfew for Japanese-Americans as well 
as Japanese aliens on the \Vest Coast. 52 The military theory was that 
some of this group were probably disloyal and might engage in sabotage 
or espionage, and that the size of the group-over 100,000-made it 
impossible to sort out the loyal from the disloyal. Therefore all must 
be at home in the night time. The Court unanimously upheld the order 
against the challenge that it denied due process, but Murphy concurred 
specially to emphasize how limited was his acquiescence. "Distinctions 
based on color and ancestry," he said, "are utterly inconsistent with 
our traditions and ideals. . . . To say that any group cannot be 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
50. I d. at 334. 
51. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 136, 146 cl.scq. (1943). 
52. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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assimilated is to admit that the great American experiment has failed." 
The order "bears a melancholy resemblance to the treatment accorded 
to members of the Jewish race in Germany." 63 At the same time, 
Murphy conceded that if the necessity were sufficiently ovenvhelming, 
some limited inconveniences based on racial distinctions might be 
constitutionally tolerable. But, he stressed, what was done here went 
"to the very brink of constitutional power." 64 Whether even a curfew 
order might be imposed for a lengthy period he reserved, and he warned 
clearly that when it came before him, he would not uphold the govern-
ment's larger claim of power to remove the Japanese-Americans 
bodily from the West Coast and place them in concentration camps 
east of the Rockies. 
The latter issue came quickly, and Murphy took the stand he had 
predicted. When the Court upheld the removal of the J apanese-Amer-
icans from the West Coast, Murphy dissented, declaring that the action 
passed beyond " 'the very brink of constitutional power' and falls 
into the ugly abyss of racism." 65 Reluctant though he was to over-
rule the military on the factual question of necessity, he accepted the 
final responsibility of the judiciary to review the military decision, and 
concluded that it rested on an "erroneous assumption of racial guilt 
rather than bona fide military necessity." 66 He conceded that there 
might be scattered disloyal persons of many racial strains. 11But to 
infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and 
justify discriminatory action against the entire group is to deny that 
under our system of law individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation 
of rights." 57 After analyzing in detail the absence of any appreciable 
factual basis for the exclusion, Murphy concluded in what has fair 
claim to being the most solemn paragraph in any of his opinions: 
"I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism. Racial dis~ 
crimination in any form and in any degree has no justifiable part 
whatever in our democratic way of life. It is unattractive in any 
setting but it is utterly revolting among a free people who have em~ 
braced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United 
States. All residents of this nation are kin in some way by blood or 
culture to a foreign land. Yet they are primarily and necessarily a 
part of the new and distinct civilization of the United States. They 
must accordingly be treated at all times as the heirs of the Amer~ 
ican experiment and as entitled to all the rights and freedoms guar-
anteed by the Constitution." 68 
53. Both quptations in this paragraph are from 320 U.S. 81, 110-11 (1943). 
54. I d. at 111. 
55. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944). In this and the companion 
case of Es parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), the Court held that Japanese-American!! 
could be evacuated from the West Coast but that loyal Japanese-Americans could not be 
detained at inland points. 
56. 323 u.s. 214, 235,236 (1944). 
57. I d. at 240. 
58. I d. at 242. 
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One other Japanese problem during the war was quite different. In 
the case of General Yamashita, the Court dealt with the validity of 
General MacArthur's war trials, hearing argument on the questions, 
among others, of the Court's jurisdiction to review such cases, and on 
the fairness of the trial itself. 59 The Yamashita military trial, as 
Murphy and others saw it,60 was an unadulterated legal lynching in 
which, so far as anyone can tell from the military tribunal's record, 
our military took bloody revenge for the crimes of others by e.xecuting 
the most important figure they happened to catch. It may be that the 
majority of the Supreme Court held only that the Constitution does 
not extend to war enemies, and that it therefore was incapable of 
reviewing the fairness of the military trial.61 \Vbatever the majority's 
view, Justice Murphy, with Justice Rutledge, dissented on the ground 
that the constitutional privileges did e.xtend to Yamashita, that there was 
jurisdiction for judicial re·view, and that the trial had been a mockery. 
Describing the military trial as "retribution" masquerading "in a 
cloak of false legalism," 62 Murphy declared that Yamashita "was 
rushed to trial under an improper charge, given insufficient time to 
prepare an adequate defense, deprived of the benefits of some of the 
most elementary rules of evidence and summarily sentenced to be 
hanged. In all this needless and unseemly haste there was no serious 
attempt to charge or to prove that he committed a recognized violation 
of the laws of war." 63 Yamashita was charged neither with committing 
atrocities nor with having authorized them, but with having failed to 
take adequate steps to control his troops. Conceding that there were 
atrocities in number, Murphy accepted the defense view that the troops 
committing them had been wholly out ofY amashita's control. Murphy 
joined also in the extended Rutledge analysis of the proceedings which, 
said Rutledge, lacked "any semblance of trial as we know that in-
stitution." 64 
59. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
60. The authoritative account is REEL, THE CAsE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA (1949). 
61. The majority opinion is completely opaque on the critical issue. At 3?:1 U.S. 6 
the Court states one of the issues to be whether the conduct of the trial "deprived petitioner 
of a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." The ques-
tion would appear to be ripe for discussion at pages 22 and 23 of the opinion, but at this 
point the Court mysteriously slides past it \\ithout saying anything, or anything intelligible, 
about it. In the summary at page 25 the Court says that it has shown that no "constitu-
tional command" was violated. In a concurring opinion in Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 
197, 199 (1949), Justice Douglas notes that he considers the war trials, at least in some 
instances, a form of political reprisal beyond the scope of judicial review. The Yamasflita 
opinion makes it difficult to know whether the majority agreed or disagreed with the dis-
senters Murphy and Rutledge on the proposition that if Yamashita. was entitled to due 
process, he was in fact denied it. 
62. 327 U.S.1, 26,30 (1946). 
63. I d. at 27, 28. 
64. I d. at 61. 
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Japanese-American problems came before the Court twice more dur-
ing Murphy's tenure in cases challenging, respectively, the validity of 
California laws aimed at keeping Japanese-Americans from owning 
agricultural land and the validity of California fishing restrictions on 
the same group.65 Both were invalidated. In each Murphy filed special 
concurrences, joined by Rutledge, emphasizing in detail the factual 
background of race bias which underlay the legislation. Describing 
the statutes as "outright racial discrimination," 66 he related fully the 
steps of the discriminatory process and concluded that they violated 
both the equal protection clause and the United Nations Charter. 
The zeal against oppression of minorities evidenced in the territorial 
and Japanese cases accompanied Murphy's analysis of the few cases 
during the 1940's involving the Negro. Most of the Negro cases in-
volved administration of criminal justice, where the principles are 
general enough to require separate discussion elsewhere in this essay. 
Relevant here, however, are the Restrictive Covenant Cases 67 and the 
white primary case,68 in which he joined the Court in invalidating the 
enforcement of anti-Negro restrictions, and Screws v. United States 00 
and Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.,1° in which he was outspoken. 
The Screws case was a prosecution of Georgia law enforcement 
officers under a federal civil rights act for clubbing to death, through 
sheer malice, a colored prisoner in their custody. Georgia had failed to 
indict them for murder. The Court split in four opinions which need 
not be reviewed in tracing Murphy's position that conviction of the 
law officers should be affirmed. To him the dead Negro had clearly 
been deprived of his life under color of state law without due process 
of law. This, as he saw it, brought the case under the clear terms of the 
statute. H~ had no reluctance to permit federal intervention to protect 
minorities where states refused to do so: "Too often unpopular minor-
ities, such as Negroes, are unable to find effective refuge from the cruel-
ties of bigoted and ruthless authority. States are undoubtedly capable 
of punishing their officers who commit such outrages. But where, as 
here, the states are unwilling for some reason to prosecute such crimes 
the federal government must step in unless constitutional guarantees 
are to become atrophied.". 71 
The Steele case involved economic discrimination against Negro 
firemen by one of the railroad brotherhoods, and the issue was ap-
65. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), the Murphy opinion beginning at 650: 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410 (1948), the Murphy opinion beginning 
at422. 
66. Oyama v. California, supra note 65, at 650. 
67. Shelley v. K,raemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). 
68. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
69. 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the Murphy opinion beginning at 134. 
70. 323'U.S. 192 (1944), the Murphy opinion beginning at 208. 
71. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 138 (1945). 
HeinOnline  -- 59 Yale L. J. 15 1949-1950
1949] JUSTICE .MURPHY: THE GOALS ATTEMPTED lJ 
propriately raised under the Railway Labor Act whether a carrier 
might be enjoined from carrying out a collective bargaining agreement 
which formalized these discriminations in job opportunities. The 
Court unanimously upheld the right to the injunction, and Murphy 
concurred specially to comment upon the "utter disregard for the 
dignity and the well-being of colored citizens shown by this record." 
In the face of this oppression, he was not content to restrict his com-
ment to "legal niceties," preferring to rest squarely on constitutional 
prohibitions of "this ugly e.xample of economic cruelty against colored 
citizens." If the statute gave the brotherhood standing not only to 
bargain, but to discriminate in bargaining, then the statute itself 
would be invalid; for "[t]he Constitution voices its disapproval when-
ever economic discrimination is applied under authority of law against 
any race, creed or color." ;2 
It is no wonder that those engaged in litigation to end segregated 
education believe that a major source of strength was lost by the un-
expected death of Justice Murphy. 
Murphy's writings on behalf of the territorials, Japanese-Americans, 
and Negroes were comparatively easy, revealing for the most part 
more soul searching than book searching. In terms of plain, tedious 
work, Murphy labored more in behalf of the American Indians than 
of all the rest of the minorities put together. 
Not all, but many, of the problems of the American Indians could be 
solved with money. By some bizarre reasoning, Congress has fre-
quently preferred not to make adequate direct appropriations in be-
half of Indian tribes, but rather to have them sue the United States 
for claimed ·violations of ancient treaties. Frequent special jurisdic-
tional acts have permitted the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court 
to hear such claims, and thus those courts become an au.xiliary to the 
appropriations systems, giving from the Treasury under the guise of 
the law of contracts what Congress has been unwilling to allow on 
grounds of simple humanity. This venerable system of self-deceit has 
worked handsomely for everyone e.xcept the Indians, who would have 
been considerably better off under a more generous and systematic 
plan of direct appropriations since the litigation is interminable and 
the lawyers' fees substantial.73 
But Murphy had to take the system as he found it. There was no 
particular likelihood that Congress would increase its appropriations, 
72. The quotations in this paragraph are taken from 323 U.S. 192, 203, 209 (1944). 
73. For a description and critique of this system see the concurring opinion of Justice 
Jackson, joined by Justice Black, in Northwestern Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 
U.S. 335, 354 (1945). This peculiar appropriations method has recently been gi\'en a new 
institutional form by the establishment of an Indian Claims Commission which has almost 
boundless authority to be generous. 60 STAT. 1049-56, 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1946). This 
statute should terminate claims litigation in the courts. Cf. Mr. Justice Black, concurring 
in United States v. Alcea Band, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946). 
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and in that situation Murphy considered the claim system better than 
nothing. He was thus immersed in the extraordinarily laborious re-
search necessary to the disposition of Indian claims. Old treaties, 
legislative debates, executive agency records, old maps, all were brought 
to bear in these cases. In addition there were Indian tax exemption 
controversies.74 Murphy wrote either majority, concurring, or special 
opinions in nine such cases. 
Starting from the classic premise that in treaty cases all doubts are 
to be resolved in favor of the Indians, Murphy sided with them in 
whole or in part in the five treaty cases in which he wrote. There 
would be little profit in reviewing the substance of these cases, but a 
list of subjects will indicate their range: Whether, between 1870 and 
1874, $66,422 paid by the government to the Seminole Tribal Council 
was so clearly destined for purposes of corruption that it must be re-
paid; whether the Seminoles had been given too little land under a 
treaty of 1866; 76 whether the United States had a duty to the Creek 
Indians to collect in their behalf moneys for the use of their lands; 70 
whether the Box Elder Treaty of 1863 should be reinterpreted in favor 
of the Shoshone Tribe; 77 whether an Executive Order of 1875 reserved 
certain lands for the Utes.78 It was plain hard work to make these 
forays into antiquity. 
In describing Murphy's scale of values, two elements emerge from 
his opinions on minority problems. First, nothing must be allowed to 
interfere with the operation of the melting pot. One of our highest 
goals is to be an integrated people, and whatever interferes with this 
aspiration is the enemy of American welfare. The due process, and 
particularly the equal protection clauses of the Constitution are the 
legal devices to be used to prevent the making of racial distinctions. 
Second, the strong must not only never abuse the weak, but must be 
ever generous. The more helpless the minority, the greater the Amer-
ican duty to it. 
The administration of justice 
In an early opinion on criminal procedure, Murphy observed that 
there was special necessity of fairness in the administration of justice 
"where the scales of justice may be delicately poised between guilt 
and innocence" 79-which is to say that some errors may be considered 
74. For Murphy opinions in this area see Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 
U.S. 705 (1943); Mahnomen County v. United States, 319 U.S. 474, 480 (1943): Okla· 
homa Ta.'C Comm'n. v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 612 (1943); West v. Oklahoma Tax 
Comm'n., 334 U.S. 717 (1948). 
75. The two Seminole cases are reported at 316 U.S. 286 and 310 (1942). 
76. Creek Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 629, 641 (1943). 
77. Northwestern Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 362 (1945), 
78. Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169, 180 (1947). 
79. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 67 (1942). 
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harmless where guilt is clear. In at least one instance of silent con-
currence in upholding a conviction in which both error and guilt 
seem apparent, he may have acted on this view.80 Yet in the totality 
of his work, particularly in his later years, Murphy shifted to the 
premise that it was the duty of the Supreme Court to set a sound ex-
ample by requiring scrupulous fairness always, without any reference 
either to technical guilt or innocence, or to general moral culpability. 
He was particularly alert to oppose the warping of criminal statutes 
away from their plain purpose. No amount of stare decisis theory 
convinced him that the Mann Act could properly be used to police 
voluntary prostitution,81 and he strongly rejected a suggestion that 
the Federal Kidnapping Act might be used to punish a seduction which, 
however ugly, had nothing to do with kidnapping.82 \Vith Murphy 
the statute had to be clearly applicable and the guilt personal 83 before 
a conviction could stand. 
Aside from death sentence cases, in which a repugnance to the death 
penalty may have occasionally led him to search for almost any reason 
for reversal,84 Murphy sought only to apply the constitutional prin-
ciples of criminal procedure, not to remake them. The right to counsel, 
the right to trial by jury, the freedom from torture, and the freedom 
from unreasonable searches and seizures were to him high values, to 
be enforced to the hilt. Since so frequently law as it is administered 
denies one or another of these rights, the law as it is spoken has some-
times accomodated to the situation by both declaring the e.xistence of 
the right and accompanying it with procedural rules making the right 
practically unavailable.85 \Vith this process Murphy had no patience. 
To him it was simple and clear that if a person was entitled to con-
stitutional rights, he should have them; and his frequent majority and 
dissenting opinions concerning the procedures concomitant with con-
stitutional rights were invariably in behalf of simplicity and effective-
ness. 56 
80. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). 
81. Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 376-7 (1944) ; United States v. Beach, 
324 U.S.193, 196 (1945). 
82. Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946). 
83. Murphy's views on criminal liability without fault are e.-:pressed in his dissenting 
opinion in United States v. Dottenveich, 320 U.S. 277,285 (1943). 
84. For C."\.<UI!ples of grasping at straws in death sentence cases, note Murphy's con-
currence in the dissenting opinions of Justices Rutledge and Burton, respectively, in Rob-
inson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286 (1945), and Louisiana f!r rei. Francis, •• Res-
weber, 329 U.S. 459, 472 (1947). 
85. For brief review of recent cases on the relation of procedure to constitutional 
rights see Frank, 15 CHL 1, 27 (19·m; 16 id. 1, 21 (1948); 17 id. I, 29 (1949). 
86. An example of Murphy's e."\.'treme irritation with what he regarded as procedural 
folderol is his dissent in Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 182 (1946). The majority, in 
considering the fairness of an Illinois trial, had declined to go behind the "common law 
record," despite a sufficiency of known facts outside that record to indicate that the trial 
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Both in criminal and civil cases, Murphy placed high premium on 
the jury system. He opposed any interference with either the proper 
selection of the jury or with its authority. To him it was vital that the 
jury be drawn from a cross section of the community and some of his 
strongest prose was written in dissents denying the constitutional 
propriety of the New York blue ribbon juries drawn predominantly 
from special classes.87 Similarly he opposed the exclusion of wage work~ 
ers from civil juries,88 and any other device which might make the 
jury less than a sampling of the people.89 
Once the jury was properly constituted, he was prepared to accept 
its verdict on matters of fact in which constitutional rights were not 
involved. The cases record no instance in which he wrote to approve 
either the setting aside of a civil jury verdict, or the directing of n 
verdict. 90 This viewpoint appeared to be prevailing at the time of 
Murphy's death, though by a thin margin, but it is probable that a 
shift in the tendency of the law back toward the subordination of the 
civil jury will result from the new Supreme Court appointments. 
Murphy's outstanding contribution to the law of criminal procedure 
concerned searches and seizures. Prior to recent years, the law had 
been that in the case of a search without a warrant as an incident to 
arrest, the police could seize only those subjects clearly visible.91 
Under that rule an arrest could not be made a pretext for a ransacking 
ramble through a man's house giving the polic;:e a right to snoop where 
had been improper. The majority opinion was perfectly in accord with procedural tradi· 
tions. Murphy said, "Legal technicalities doubtless afford justification for our pretense of 
ignoring plain facts before us, facts upon which a man's very life or liberty conceivably 
could depend. Moreover, there is probably legal warrant for our not remanding the case 
•.. to allow those facts to be incorporated in the formal record. • . • But the result cer· 
tainly docs not enhance the high traditions of the judicial ·process. In my view, when un-
disputed facts appear in the record before us in a case involving a man's life or liberty, 
they should not be ignored if justice demands their use." I d. at 183. 
Important Murphy opinions on points of criminal procedure are Wade v. Mayo, 334 
U.S. 672 (1948) (exhaustion of state remedies and its relation to claim of federal rights); 
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948) (miscellaneous problems of habeas corpus). 
87. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 296 (1947); Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565, 
569 (1948). 
88. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). 
89. Thus Murphy joined the dissent in Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 514 
(1948), a case in which the majority, under peculiar circumstances, approved of a jury 
composed of twelve government employees. 
90. Examples of Murphy opinions in behalf of the civil jury are Jacob v. New York 
City, 315 U.S. 752 (1942) ; Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332, 340 (1942) ; Tennant v. 
Peoria & P. Ry., 321 U.S. 29 (1944). He also joined in the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Black in Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943), a most comprehensive and 
vigorous defense of the civil jury. 
91. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), limited in Go-Bart Importing Co, 
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 
(1932). 
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they would. In Harris v. United States,92 the Court by a margin of 
five to four appeared93 to abandon that principle. Harris was arrested 
in his home, and the FBI, without a search warrant, spent five hours 
ransacking the house. Eventually they found a sealed envelope in a 
bedroom drawer which contained evidence of a different offense com-
pletely unrelated to the cause of the arrest. The first offense was then 
abandoned, and Harris was charged with the second. 
This broadening of the right to search as an incident of arrests as a 
practical matter almost eliminates the function of the search warrant. 
It means that a man's home is his castle only so long as he stays out-
side of it, being careful to be arrested on the streets; for if the arresting 
officers find him at home, he is completely denuded of privacy. Describ-
ing the police action as a resurrection of "the general warrant or writ 
of assistance, presumably outlawed forever from our society by the 
Fourth Amendment," 94 Murphy dissented in an opinion both im-
passioned and scholarly. As he saw it, a social balance must be cast 
between the occasional capture of a criminal who might othen\'ise 
escape, and the invasion of privacy of citizens generally. 
These alternatives gave an easy choice. It would be simple to arrest 
on any pretext as an e..xcuse for invading a home. The device of un-
limited search had in the past been a tool of political tyranny, "and 
history has a way of repeating itself." Murphy anticipated police 
ransacking of homes as incidents of arrests, looking for "anything" 
of a disloyal character. He would rather that a few criminals go un-
detected than sanction "this abandonment of the right of privacy." g:; 
At the next term, the Court either modified or clarified the Harris 
rule in Trupia?to v. U1tited States,96 another five to four decision but 
this time with Murphy writing the opinion of the Court. The de-
fendants were arrested and evidence of their crime, standing in plain 
sight about them, was seized without a warrant. The case thus differed 
from the Harris case in the obvious nature of the evidence seized. It 
differed also in that there was no conceivable reason for failing to 
obtain a search warrant other than sheer carelessness or caprice since a 
government agent had long posed as a member of the criminal band 
and the raid had been carefully planned. Murphy distinguished the 
Harris case on the latter ground, holding the search invalid but in-
dicating in passing that the Harris rule must be limited to situations 
in which search warrants are not "reasonably practicable." The deaths 
92. 331 U.S. 145 (1947), the Murphy dissent beginning at 183. 
93. The ambiguous term is used in the text because of uncertainties as to the full scope 
of the opinion. 
94. 331 u.s. 145, 183 (1947). 
95. The quotations in the paragraph may be found id. at 194. 
96. 334 u.s. 699 (1948). 
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of Justices Murphy and Rutledge make it most unlikely that the 
Trupiano exception will swallow the Harris rule. 97 
Murphy's last search and seizure opinion was one of the half-dozen 
outstanding opinions written by him in the full course of his career.03 
In Wolf v. Colorado,99 a state criminal case, evidence had been seized 
under circumstances which, if the offense had been federal, would have 
violated the search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment. 
Hence, under the federal rule, the evidence would have been inadmis-
sible. The issues in the Wolf case were first, whether the limitation of 
searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment should be considered 
an element of "due process," and thus be a limitation upon the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment; and second, whether, if so, the 
evidence should, as in the federal system, be inadmissible. 
The majority split the difference by holding that the states were 
prohibited from unreasonable searches and seizures, but that the 
evidence produced by such an illegal search would nonetheless be 
admissible. To Murphy such a decision was almost incomprehensible. 
Why should the Court pretend that the states were limited from making 
unreasonable searches and seizures if it were "unwilling to make the 
step which can give some meaning to the pronouncements it utters''? 100 
Holmes had said of a proposal to permit the admission of illegally 
seized evidence in federal courts that "It reduces the Fourth Amend" 
ment to a form of words." 101 The Court had previously held that if 
such evidence were admissible in federal proceedings, the Fourth 
Amendment "might as well be striken from the Constitution." 102 
Since Murphy agreed completely with those earlier views, he derided 
the majority for tolerating "shabby business: lawlessness by officers 
of the law." 103 
Labor relations 
Unless the whole vast area of civil rights be treated as one "field," 
Murphy wrote more often in labor relations than in any other field of 
law. A survey of even his broadly important labor cases is beyond the 
97. In my own view, both Harris and Tmpiano were out of accord with the eminently 
satisfactory pre-existing law as declared in the cases cited in note 91 supra. The Trrepia11o 
seizure should have been lawful for the same reason that the Harris seizure should not 
have been lawful, i.e., because of the "plain sight rule" of the earlier cases which permits 
seizures of illicit articles visible at the time of a lawful arrest. 
98. A suggested list of the others: Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ; 
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) ; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) ; 
United Mine Workers v. United States, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Industrial Comm'n. v. Me· 
Cartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947). Each is discussed briefly in the text. 
99. 338 u.s. 25 (1949). 
100. !d. at 41. 
101. Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,392 (1920). 
102. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). 
103. 338 u.s. 25, 46 (1949). 
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scope of this article and would be unnecessary to the central inquiry 
here; for the many labor cases are wholly consistent with one another, 
and Murphy's underlying objectives can be discerned without studying 
more than a few. 
Murphy's political strength was labor strength. The greatest 
achievement or the greatest shame of his life, depending on whether 
one is a friendly or hostile critic, was the peaceful handling of the sit-
down strikes. In his own view, it was his greatest achievement, for it 
avoided bloodshed, and Murphy was a humane man. 
As a humanitarian in the labor movement, it was natural that 
Murphy should have a primary interest in the most humane of the 
labor statutes, the Fair Labor Standards Act. He was a member of the 
platform committee at the Democratic Convention of 1936, and along 
with then Senator Hugo Black fought hard to obtain a party commit-
ment to legislation for "minimum wages, ma.ximum hours, child labor, 
and working conditions." 104 The Act he had helped to secure as a 
politician he helped to apply as a Justice, and he wrote majority or 
dissenting opinions in at least fifteen wage-hour cases. He consistently 
gave maximum coverage to the Act, 105 and most critically e.~ed 
the rash of schemes to skirt its verbally simple mandate of time and 
one half for overtime. 106 
In interpreting the Act, Murphy guided himself by his impression 
of its underlying purpose. It was an Act "remedial and humanitarian." 
It dealt not with "mere chattels or articles of trade but with the rights 
of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of their freedom 
and talents to the use and profit of others. Those are the rights that 
Congress has specially legislated to protect. Such a statute must not 
be interpreted or applied in a narrow or grudging manner." 107 And 
Murphy was never grudging in its application. His opinions established 
the right of recovery of wages for iron and coal miners for the e.'\.-tended 
and uncomfortable periods spent in passing from the surface of the 
earth to the place of actual labor; 108 and it was his opinion in behalf 
of portal-ta-portal pay 109 that led to modifications of the Act by the 
Eightieth Congress. 
104. FRANK, MR. JusTICE BLACK 92 (1949). 
105. A rare e.'\.-ample of a :Murphy dissent arguing that in the particular instance the 
Act was not applicable is :Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.S. 178, 185 (1946). 
106. The most important loophole in the Act is that discussed in Walling v. Bclo Corp., 
316 U.S. 624 (1942), a~ decision in which :Murphy dissented. He remained one of the 
only members of the Court who considered it appropriate thereafter to o\'errule the Bclo 
interpretation despite the subsequent reliance which had been placed on it. Watling v. 
Halliburton Oil Well Co., 331 U.S. 17, 26, 27 (19·t7). 
107. Tenn. C. I. & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (19-14). 
108. Tenn. C. I. & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590 (19-14); Jewell Ridge Corp v. 
Local No. 6167,325 U.S.161 (1945). 
109. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). 
HeinOnline  -- 59 Yale L. J. 22 1949-1950
22 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 59: 1 
The sentence quoted above suggests Murphy's labor philosophy. 
People who work with their hands, he thought, customarily give at 
least as much to their employers as they get in return. They have 
rights, some of them stemming from the Constitution and some stem-
ming from remedial legislation, which they themselves have won 
through political action. Whether in the case of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, the National Labor Relations Act, or the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, Murphy was prepared to insure that labor secured its due. It was 
rare for Murphy not to uphold the Labor Board, and normally he was 
aggressive in its support.110 
In his last year on the Court a Labor-Management Relations Act 
case evoked for Murphy memories of his own experiences with the sit-
down strikes. The Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts recognize the rights 
of employees to engage in "concerted activities," a euphemism which 
among other things describes strikes. The issue was whether a state 
might, by its own action, take out of the general area of "concerted 
activities" particular kinds of strikes of which it disapproved,. making 
those strikes illegal within its borders despite the Federal Act. The 
majority, in a somewhat ambiguous opinion, appeared to answer the 
question in the affirmative; and in the particular case, the intermittent 
strike, which is a series of quick and short work stoppages all aimed at a 
common goal, was declared illegal. 111 Murphy, seeing in that position 
an end to the federal protection of the right to strike, dissented sharply. 
He conceded that the Act extended no protection, under Court de-
cisions, to "a sit-down strike, a mutiny, and a strike in violation of a 
contract," but beyond these exceptions he would not lightly go. The 
intermittent strike, said Murphy, was objectionable only because it 
was effective, and he for one was unwilling to say that the right to 
strike lost its federal protection merely because such strikes 11are 
effective from the union's point of view." 112 
The two most colorful Murphy opinions concerning labor relations 
were in the Thornhill case 113 and the Lewis case.114 In the former, 
Murphy speaking for the Court declared that the states might not 
constitutionally put a total prohibition on peaceful picketing, at 
110. Murphy believed without mental reservation that collective bargaining was essen· 
tial to modern life. See, e.g., discussion in NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 
404 et seq. (1947). A rare instance of non-approval of a Labor Board order is NLRB v. 
Virginia Elec. & P. Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). But cf. Virginia Elec. & P. Co. v. NLRB, 
319 u.s. 533 (1943). 
111. International Union, U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Emp. Ret. Bd., 336 q.S. 245 (1949), 
discussed at Frank, 17 Cnx.1, 7 (1949). · 
112. International Union, U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Emp. Ret. Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 268, 269, 
270 (1949). 
113. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
114. United Mine Workers v. United States, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
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least if it were picketing for legal ends.115 The Tlzomlzill case, which 
has been cited more than 300 times in published reports, had a most 
substantial effect on the conduct of labor relations, giving a freedom 
and status to picketing which it had never enjoyed before. In breadth 
of consequence, it has been the most significant Murphy majority 
opmmn. 
The Lewis case shows Murphy hitting his hardest. A peaceful but 
complete coal strike was paralyzing the economy. The administration 
had tried and had been unable to obtain legislation from Congress 
empowering it to break such strikes by injunction. It then invoked 
the legal fiction that it had "seized" the coal mines and applied for an 
injunction without legislative authority. The principal legal obstacle 
was the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which forbade injunctions in "any 
labor dispute," with e..xceptions irrelevant here. The Court, combining 
the fiction of government "ownership" with a legal fairy story, avoided 
the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition by holding it inapplicable to strikes 
in which the government was the "owner," thus breaking the strike, 
restoring the flow of coal, and bailing the Administration out of a most 
difficult situation. 
The Murphy and Rutledge dissents illustrate the teamwork of the 
two. The bulk of the legal analysis is in the forty-three page Rutledge 
dissent in which Murphy joined. In an additional six page statement, 
Murphy highlighted the practical aspects of the situation. He con-
ceded that the coal strike was bringing economic calamity; but he 
contended that the economic crisis did not "permit the conversion of 
the judicial process into a weapon for misapplying statutes according 
to the grave exigencies of the moment." 110 The larger menace in the 
situation was the precedent that the government, "at the behest of 
employers," might undertake to break strikes generally. The fiction of 
seizure, he observed, was an easy subterfuge by which the government 
could borrow the legal title, break the strike, and give the title back 
to the employer. "That," he charged, "is essentially what happened 
in this case." 117 If this was to be the country's policy, Congress should 
adopt it rather than have the Administration and the Court create it. 118 
115. The qualifying clause should be emphasized in the light of Giboney "· Empire 
Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), in which Murphy joined. 
116. United Mine Workers v. United States, 330 U.S. 258,335,336 (1947). 
117. I d. at 339. 
118. This attitude illustrates an important distinction in :Murphy's thinking on judicial 
policy making under the guise of statutory interpretation. Though he was a free policy-
maker himself, he attempted to guide himself by the general intent or spirit of the statute. 
Thus, as the foregoing text discussion indicates, he was quick to use the general purposes 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, for example, as an aid in determining the meaning of a 
precise phrase. But he was apparently genuinely shocked at statutory interpretation 
squarely in conflict with the general purpose of such a statute as the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act. 
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There has been no one in American public life not drawn from trade 
union origins himself who has been any more cordial to the aspirations 
of organized labor or more kindly disposed to the welfare of all labor 
than Murphy was throughout his career. There is in his writing no 
tra~e either of Marxist economic theory or of American radical move-
ments. There is, instead, a reiteration of humanitarian notions of fair 
play. 
STATURE 
The Murphy of the opinions is neither a mystic nor a visionary. He 
is instead a judge of determination, anger, power, and massive in-
transigence. The America Murphy was trying to build had hard, con-
crete outlines in his mind. It was an America in which a man's religion 
was, so far as the state was concerned, entirely his private affair. It 
was an America in which the directors of political, economic, and social 
affairs would be totally blind to the existence of divergent racial strains 
among the people.119 It was an America in which a man could advocate 
any political views he might choose, free of any penalty whatsoever. It 
was an America in which the right to counsel meant no more and no 
less than that the accused should have a lawyer; 120 and in which free-
dom from unreasonable searches and seizures meant, without reserva-
tion or evasion, that the police must stay out of the citizen's home un-
less they had an unequivocally proper right to be there. 
In these respects, Murphy's America was neither strange nor new. It 
was, within the necessary limitations of a century's difference in time, 
James Madison's America, too. But the Twentieth Century cannot be 
the Nineteenth even for the sake of old heroes or modern nostalgia, and 
Murphy faced problems Madison did not know. Murphy's America 
119. Except to aid victims of past discriminations, as in the Indian cases. 
120. Murphy was consistently of the minority upholding the right to counsel in all 
criminal cases of any seriousness, regardless of the poverty of the accused. Betts v. 
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) ; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 677 (1948). 
In civil rights cases generally, Murphy supported the claimed right whenever there 
was any possible difference of opinion on the validity of the claim. During his last three 
years on the Court, his position in all non-unanimous civil rights cases, reduced to nu· 
merical totals and compared to his brethren, was as follows : 
Distribution of Votes in Non-unanimous Civil Rights Cases, 
Oct.1946-1948 Terms 
In support of the 111 deuial of tile 
claimed right claimed nght 
Vinson 8 49 
Black 39 17 
Reed 8 49 
Frankfurter 23 34 
Douglas 47 10 
Murphy 53 3 
Jackson 14 41 
Rutledge 52 4 
Burton 10 47 
The data on which the table is based are discussed in Frank, 17 Cm. 1, 35 (1949), 
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included the freedom of the individual from the state, but freedom 
from a state more powerful than any had been before. No judge has 
ever envisioned the federal power more broadly. Murphy meant that 
power to be used. He stood for real utility regulation; 121 for collective 
bargaining and strong unions; for a wage floor and an hour limit 
throughout industry; for the most vigorous enforcement of laws for the 
benefit oflabor, agriculture, 122 and the consumer.123 
To achieve these ends, Murphy's jurisprudence took for its guide 
less the cases, legislative histories, and statutory refinements which are 
usually the lawyer's tools, and more the Constitution itself and the 
social principles of President Roosevelt. Occasionally unsure of him-
self at the beginning of his judicial service, 124 he finally set his direction 
clearly and held to it. 
To write of one Justice, rather than of the institution on which he 
served, inevitably creates the misimpression of a man in a vacuum. 
Murphy was not alone. Before March, 1943, the dissent or concur-
rence of Black, Douglas, and Murphy was a common by-line, and 
after that date the appointment of Rutledge, Murphy's closest in-
tellectual ally, brought the group to four. 125 But the frequent cohesion 
of this group should not obscure their great differences in outlook, in 
notion of the judicial function, and in method of craftsmanship.m It is 
important in appraising Murphy to remember that though he teamed 
well with these brothers, three of the strongest men and ablest crafts-
men in the Court's history, he was not swallowed or submerged by 
them. He retained the independence of a determined man. 
He who would strike history's balance on a man newly dead risks 
121. See, for e.'=Ilple, his position in Federal Power Comm'n. v. Naural Gas Pipeline 
Co., 315 U.S. 575, 599 (19·m ; Federal Power Comm'n. v. Hope Nat. Gas. Co., 320 U.S. 
591 (1944). 
122. One of many examples is his position in ICC v. Inland \Vatenvays Corp., 319 
u.s. 671, 692 (1943). 
123. See, for e.'=Ilple, his position in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 
495, 534 (1948), and his dissent in Bruce's Juices v. American Om Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 
(1947). 
124. Commented upon in Rodell, Fel~ Frauk/ttrler, Cou.scrt'ativc, 183 HA!u>EI!S 449, 
457, 458 (1941). 
125. At the 1947 and 1948 terms, the number of Murphy's agreements with ca.ch of his 
brethren in the 61 most important cases in which he participated was as follows : 
Vinson 30 Douglas 48 
Black 49 Jackson 21 
Reed 29 Rutledge 54 
Frankfurter 27 Burton 23 
These figures are taken from tables fully e.'\.-plaincd in Frank, 16 Cnr. 1, 47 (1948) ; 
and 17 id. 1, 45 (1949). 
126. Thus in terms of such jurisprudential disputes as that over the proper e.;:tent of 
judicial policy making, the four cannot rationally be easily lumped into a group; but c/. 
Schlesinger, supra note 2. In a large number of the opinions discussed in the te.-.:t abo,·c, 
:Murphy was in disagreement with one or more of these three brethren. 
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almost certain correction. Yet posterity may find some aid in the ap .. 
praisals of the present: Frank Murphy as a Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States was the embodiment in a high place of a 
lowly but persistent American ideal of human justice. He consistently, 
and with effective prose, sought to establish or to reinforce in American 
law basic constitutional principles of human freedom, and basic prin-
ciples of social justice. His philosophy was clear and he firmly' adhered 
to it. To the limited extent that others shared them, his views pre-
vailed; but in matters most important to him, he was not in the ma-
jority. His death, with that of his brother Rutledge, makes it im-
probable that some of his most basic convictions will retain adherents 
even in a substantial minority of the Supreme Court. Yet the courage 
and clarity of his writing will provide him an honored place when the 
history of the judiciary in the 1940's is written. 
